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Abstract
The Precautionary Principle is typically construed as a conservative decision rule 
aimed at preventing harm. But Martin Peterson (JME 33: 5–10, 2007; The ethics of 
technology: A geometric analysis of five moral principles, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2017) has argued that the principle is better understood as an epistemic rule, 
guiding decision-makers in forming beliefs rather than choosing among possible 
acts. On the epistemic view, he claims there is a principle concerning expert disa-
greement underlying precautionary-based reasoning called the ecumenical principle: 
all expert views should be considered in a precautionary appraisal, not just those 
that are the most prominent or influential. In articulating the doxastic commitments 
of decision-makers under this constraint, Peterson precludes any probabilistic rule 
that might result in combining expert opinions. For combined or consensus prob-
abilities are likely to provide decision-makers with information that is more precise 
than warranted. Contra Peterson, I argue that upon adopting a broader conception of 
probability, there is a probabilistic rule, under which expert opinions are combined, 
that is immune to his criticism and better represents the ecumenical principle.
1 Introduction
To mitigate the risk of harm from a given activity, policymakers should institute pre-
cautionary measures, even in case of scientific uncertainty. That is the idea under-
lying the so-called Precautionary Principle (PP). However, there is little consensus 
on how exactly the PP is defined (see Boyer-Kassem, 2017). Although there is no 
universally accepted formulation of the principle, the PP is typically construed as a 
constraint on decision-making under uncertainty. 1
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But Martin Peterson (2006) has challenged the received view with an impossibil-
ity result “showing that no version of the precautionary principle can be reason-
ably applied to decisions that may lead to fatal outcomes” (Peterson, 2007, p. 6). 
Despite dealing a significant blow to the PP, Peterson (2007, 2017) suggests that the 
principle can be preserved by interpreting it as an epistemic rule, guiding decision-
makers in forming doxastic attitudes, absent scientific certainty. In other words, the 
PP should instead be construed as a rule for advising decision-makers on what to 
believe in the face of scientific uncertainty, not choosing among possible acts.
On the epistemic view, Peterson (2007) claims that the PP is grounded by three 
principles. They are a preference for false positives, i.e., prioritize null hypothesis 
statistical significance testing in scientific research. The ecumenical principle, i.e., 
all expert views should be considered in a precautionary appraisal, not just those 
that are the most prominent or influential. The principle of non-monotonicity, i.e., 
more is not always better. Granting that the PP might indeed be better understood as 
an epistemic rule grounded by the latter principles, at least in scientifically relevant 
matters, my focus in this paper is on the ecumenical principle.
In carefully articulating it, Peterson characterizes the doxastic commitments of 
decision-makers in terms of qualitative, full beliefs, which preclude decision-mak-
ers from forming probabilistic degrees of belief or credences in response to expert 
disagreement. His reason is that if the doxastic commitments of decision-makers 
are interpreted probabilistically, the principle might be taken as a rule for aggregat-
ing opinions, such as weighted averaging, to form a consensus view on behalf of 
experts. But combined or consensus probabilities are likely to overstate the evidence 
by providing decision-makers with information more precise than warranted. How-
ever, Peterson’s reasoning is short-sighted and has led him to advance an inadequate 
account of the ecumenical principle, considering that expert opinions concerning 
scientific hypotheses and theories often vary in strength, and so should those of 
decision-makers.
In this paper, I argue that upon accepting that beliefs vary in strength and that 
they might also be imprecise, a feasible imprecise probabilistic representation of 
the doxastic commitments of decision-makers can be given, under which conflict-
ing expert judgments are combined. I will show that the proposed account of the 
ecumenical principle is partially consistent with the doxastic constraints imposed by 
Peterson, but satisfying weaker versions of the constraints only is fortunate, as the 
proposed account avoids an inconsistency his account gives rise to due to its overly 
permissive nature. Furthermore, the reader will find that the imprecise probabilistic 
representation is not subject to Peterson’s criticism that combined probabilities are 
prone to overstating the evidence and that in addition, it avoids an opposite concern 
that his account is susceptible to, namely, understating the evidence. The proposed 
account therefore enjoys several advantages over Peterson’s and better represents the 
ecumenical principle.
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2  The Ecumenical Principle
Disagreement occurs on practically every matter, often leading to epistemic con-
flict. While some might have the intuition that disagreement is a negative feature of 
discourse, especially in the context of scientific research, such an intuition has been 
shown to be false. Under certain conditions, disagreement can improve the accuracy 
of collective judgments via the ‘wisdom of crowds’ (Surowiecki, 2005), promote 
different perspectives (Harding, 1991; Longino, 1990), and prompt reflective evalua-
tion resulting in epistemic humility (Elga, 2007).
Although disagreement yields some epistemic benefits, it can hinder progress by 
inducing further uncertainty. It is unsurprising then why non-expert decision-mak-
ers, such as policymakers, often have difficulty devising a plan of action when the 
evidence made available to them by an expert community is conflicting. But even 
so, decision-makers must continue moving towards meeting their objectives. How, 
though, should they proceed when confronted with conflicting expert opinions? Cue 
the ecumenical principle.
In cases where experts disagree, it is often difficult for the decision maker to 
take this disagreement into account in a reasonable way. In many cases, one 
simply has to decide which expert appears to be most trustworthy. Arguably, 
this is something that could be questioned from an epistemic point of view. 
According to the ecumenical principle, all expert views should be considered 
in a precautionary appraisal, not only the views put forward by the most prom-
inent or influential expert. (Peterson, 2007, p. 8)
Put more succinctly, the ecumenical principle might be defined as follows.
Ecumenical Principle (EP). A theory or proposition is precautionarily 
appraised if and only if all expert views on the matter are taken into account, 
not just those of the most prominent or influential experts.
Under this generic formulation of the principle, it follows that decision-makers are 
compelled to respect the views of all experts. However, the principle as defined 
lacks specifics on what beliefs decision-makers should arrive at as a result.
Peterson addresses the latter deficiency by characterizing the doxastic commit-
ments of decision-makers through the following constraints.
(OB)ligation: it is obligatory to believe a proposition X if and only if every 
expert believes X;
(PER)mission: it is permissible to believe a proposition X if and only if at least 
some experts believe X;
(PRO)hibition: it is forbidden to believe a proposition X if and only if no expert 
believes X. (2007, p. 9)
Notice that the doxastic commitments of decision-makers on Peterson’s view are 
restricted to qualitative, full beliefs. This restriction engenders an obvious practi-
cal advantage. In particular, when choosing among possible acts, decision-makers 
only need to decide on the basis of their adopted full beliefs rather than taking on a 
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more arduous task of identifying the optimal act(s) through some complex decision 
calculus.
However, it is not obvious that the doxastic commitments of decision-makers 
under the EP should be limited to full beliefs, especially considering that experts 
tend to form numerical degrees of belief or credences in theories or propositions, 
e.g., 66–100% credence that the mean global temperature will increase by 1.5 
degrees centigrade by the year 2052 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018).2 But Peterson 
appears to justify the restriction to qualitative, full beliefs in his account of the EP 
through the following remark,
If some quantitative (probabilistic) principle is adopted for reconciling diver-
gent expert opinions, the policy maker may probably be presented with mate-
rial that appears to be much more precise than it actually is. (2007, p. 9)
His remark seems to suggest that the trouble with a probabilistic representation of 
the EP is that the principle might be mistaken as a rule for aggregating conflict-
ing expert opinions through some procedure like weighted averaging (Stone, 1961). 
Although aggregation rules may be convenient in summarizing diverging expert 
opinions, they risk overstating the evidence.
Peterson may have come to this conclusion by sharing a common intuition held 
by many about subjective probability, namely, that it is a sharp numerical represen-
tation of how strongly an individual (or group) believes something. It is the precise 
nature of probabilistic opinions that could cause decision-makers to be misled, and 
even more so if the probabilistic opinions of experts are combined, resulting merely 
in a precise summary statistic.
But Peterson’s reasoning is short-sighted considering that such a narrow concep-
tion of probability was challenged long ago by Frank Knight (1921) in his distinc-
tion between ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’. According to Knight, the former is subject to 
precise measurement, whereas the latter is not. Knight was not alone in taking issue 
with the precision of classical probability. Many others have also found alternative 
forms of mathematical probability to be desirable for epistemic and decision-the-
oretic reasons, including Isaac Levi (1974), Peter Walley (1991), and James Joyce 
(2010), for example.
In the next section, I will show that by adopting a broader conception of prob-
ability, namely, imprecise probability, there is a probabilistic representation of the 
doxastic commitments of decision-makers that is consistent with the EP, partially 
consistent with (OB)-(PER)-(PRO), and immune to the criticism that combined 
probabilities are likely to overstate the evidence.
2 It is important to note that full beliefs and degrees of belief or credences are not incommensurable. 
Peterson’s view may be consistent with the so-called Lockean Thesis (Foley, 1993), where an indi-
vidual’s credence is sufficiently high enough to constitute outright belief in a proposition. For a recent 
account not only on the unification of full belief and credence but also their dynamics, see Leitgeb 
(2017).
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3  The Ecumenical Principle Represented by Imprecise Probability
Although full belief affords decision-makers convenience, less than full belief in sci-
entific propositions may be inevitable due to uncertainty. Consider the novel corona-
virus that has spread globally and affected over a hundred million people worldwide 
at the time of writing. Since medical researchers are still seeking an effective treat-
ment for symptomatic patients, the proposition that treatment t effectively reduces 
symptoms (denoted as Reduce) remains uncertain, where t is in the domain of treat-
ments currently under consideration.
In accommodating uncertain matters within an expert community, an expert’s 
(rational) degrees of belief or credences may be formally modeled by a probability 
function p on a (finite) Boolean algebra of propositions B, relative to a set of possi-
ble worlds W. But on a more liberal conception of subjective probability, an expert’s 
credences may instead be modeled by a non-empty set of probability functions P on 
the Boolean algebra. Credences under this more general mathematical representa-
tion are set-based rather than point-valued and can be imprecise.3
On occasions where an expert’s credences are imprecise, the imprecision might 
be due to the evidence made available at that time. Consider the COVID-19 pan-
demic, for example. Many things remain unknown at the moment, including which 
course of treatment is most effective for reducing symptoms, whether the newly 
developed vaccines provide immunity against different strains of the virus, how 
long face coverings should continue to be worn after a sizeable portion of the global 
population has been vaccinated, etc. Gaps in the evidence might compel an expert 
to form set-based credences in relevant propositions, e.g., P(Reduce) = {0.5, 0.7} 
and P(~ Reduce) = {0.3, 0.5}, and rationally so, as their credal state is fixed by the 
evidence in hand, no more and no less. The rationality of imprecise credences on 
occasions where evidence is incomplete but not absent ought to convince us that 
probabilistic representations should not be dismissed in characterizing the doxastic 
commitments of decision-makers under the EP.
But even in admitting that experts occasionally form rational credences and the 
credences may either be precise or imprecise, credences often differ from individual 
to individual, causing difficulty for decision-makers in forming judgments of their 
own. Consider, for example, a group of virology experts that agree on a class of anti-
virals to experimentally test on positive COVID-19 patients, but the virologists disa-
gree about the effectiveness of each treatment individually, where credences are low, 
high, and somewhere in between across the set of possible outcomes. How should 
decision-makers go about taking into account the diverging expert credences? Clas-
sical probabilists might suggest employing an aggregation strategy such as linear 
pooling, where an expert’s opinion, for all propositions X, is weighted based on 
the expert’s reliability and combined through weighted averaging (Dietrich & List, 
3 Note that ‘imprecise probability’ encompasses more than sets of probability functions (see Walley 
(2000) for a review) and varies in motivation from evidential support (see e.g., Levi, 1974; Joyce, 2010) 
to ambiguity averse preferences (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989).
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2016). However, it is this kind of procedure that leads to the issue Peterson is con-
cerned about.
Consider a pair of medical experts, A and B, that have credences 0.3 and 0.9 in 
the proposition Reduce, respectively, and suppose that the experts are equally com-
petent and reliable. The equal-weighted average in credence between them is 0.6. 
But as a collective or consensus opinion presented to decision-makers, it fails to 
convey the degree to which the two experts’ opinions diverge. Furthermore, 0.6 cre-
dence implies that collectively, the medical experts are more confident in Reduce 
than ~ Reduce under the weighted averaging rule, suggesting that Reduce has more 
evidential support when that is not the case. One can see now why Peterson is 
inclined to reject probabilistic principles for reconciling conflicting probabilistic 
judgments. His concern is further reinforced by the fair chance that the weighted 
averaging rule is the first aggregation strategy that comes to mind for many, given its 
familiarity.
But these observations of a specific kind of aggregation procedure should not 
convince us that all hope is lost for a feasible credal interpretation of the doxas-
tic commitments of decision-makers under the EP. For linear pooling, of course, is 
not the only way to aggregate beliefs. Some have recently illustrated the epistemic 
advantages of alternatively aggregating beliefs through imprecise probabilities (see 
Stewart & Quintana, 2018). Drawing on the imprecise probability approach to belief 
aggregation and a recent account given by Elkin and Wheeler (2018) concerning 
peer disagreement, I propose that a decision-maker’s doxastic state is constrained by 
the following principle in case the views of experts diverge on a given matter.
IP. For all permissible doxastic states D, a decision-maker should adopt D if 




(X) , for all n 
experts and propositions X in some Boolean algebra B.4
What this principle implies in the earlier case, for example, is that decision-makers 
should adopt imprecise credences P(Reduce) = {0.3, 0.9} and P(~ Reduce) = {0.1, 
0.7} in light of the disagreement between medical experts A and B.
The proposed IP principle has several advantages. First, IP sidesteps an incon-
sistency that Peterson’s account gives rise to from his endorsement of the right to 
left direction of (PER)—if at least some experts believe X, then it is permissible to 
believe X. It follows from the right to left direction of (PER) that if the most influen-
tial experts believe X, then a decision-maker is permitted to believe X, despite some 
non-influential experts believing ~ X. But the EP prohibits decision-makers from 
ignoring or discarding the views of experts having less influence or prominence 
4 In disambiguating ‘opinion’ and ‘view’, I will treat the former in this context narrowly as the credence 
(precise or imprecise) given by an expert to a single proposition and the latter as the opinions of an 
expert with respect to all possibilities considered by the expert. Formally, an expert’s view is represented 
by a non-empty set of probability functions P on a Boolean algebra of propositions B, relative to a set of 
possible worlds W. Extended to n experts, a combination of views held by all experts consists of all the 
opinions of all possibilities considered by all n experts. Of course, this idealization assumes that there 
is agreement on the set of possibilities since all expert views are defined on the same Boolean algebra. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out the ambiguity.
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within the community. Hence the inconsistency. By comparison, IP does not sat-
isfy the right to left direction (see below). Consequently, IP is less permissive. But 
failing to satisfy the right to left direction of (PER) is fortunate, not fatal, since the 
inconsistency is avoided, unlike on Peterson’s overly permissive qualitative account.
Second, IP is consistent with the EP as defined. It follows from IP that every 
expert view is taken into account under the required doxastic state D, as every expert 
view, Pi, is a subset of D. So, no expert’s view is ignored or discarded for lacking 
influence or prominence within the community. If, however, some expert’s view is 
not a subset of D, then, trivially, D does not consist of the union of all expert opin-
ions for all propositions X, thereby violating IP. We see then that the general idea 
underlying the EP of accounting for every expert view is implied by IP, thus making 
the doxastic principle consistent with the EP.
Third, IP is partially consistent with Peterson’s constraints. On the (OB) require-
ment, IP satisfies the right to left direction. If all experts hold the same view, i.e., 
P1 = … = Pn, then the required doxastic state D by IP is P such that P = Pi, for 
i = 1,…, n. IP, however, does not satisfy the left to right direction. Suppose that 
the required doxastic state D by IP is P, but 1 and 2 differ in their views such that 
P1 ≠ P2. It is obviously false then that P = Pi, for i = 1,…, n.
On (PER), since IP implies that D is permissible if and only if D just consists of 
the union of all expert opinions for all propositions X, it logically follows that the 
views held by some experts are contained in D. IP, however, does not satisfy the 
right to left direction. But again, this is fortunate since IP avoids the inconsistency 
resulting from (PER) and the EP. To see how the right to left direction is not met, 
suppose P1 is a subset of D, but P2 is not, for experts i = 1, 2. The antecedent of the 
right to left direction of (PER) is true, but the consequent is false given that D does 
not consist of the union of all expert opinions for all propositions X.





 and doxastic state D is empty, then D obviously does not consist of the union 
of all expert opinions for all propositions X and is impermissible. IP does not satisfy 
the left to right direction. Consider the above instance where P1 is a subset of D but 






is not empty. Thus, we find that IP only satisfies weaker versions of Peterson’s con-
straints. But violating the original constraints is quite reasonable, especially consid-
ering the inconsistency generated by (PER) and the EP.
Fourth, IP is immune to Peterson’s criticism against permitting probabilistic rules 
in characterizing the doxastic commitments of decision-makers under the EP. IP 
implies that a decision-maker’s doxastic state is fixed in accordance with the infor-
mation in hand, no more and no less. In fact, a hallmark of imprecise probabilities 
generally is that they match the character of the evidence (Sturgeon, 2010). So much 
for overstating the evidence.
Finally, IP is more transparent than Peterson’s qualitative account on evidential 
support by realizing lower and upper bounds on credence. Consider the case of med-
ical experts A and B from before. Under the IP principle, Reduce is given a mini-
mum credence of 30% and a maximum credence of 90%. Decision-makers are thus 
committed to unique ranges of credence when conflicting evidence yields different 
levels of support for and against propositions. That is, IP commits decision-makers 
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to adopting ranges of credence bounded by the least and greatest amounts of cre-
dence supported by their evidence.
The qualitative account, on the other hand, can mask the evidential support for 
some propositions. Unfortunately for Peterson, this exposes his view of the EP to an 
opposite concern. In particular, Peterson’s qualitative account is prone to understat-
ing the evidence. To see this, suppose that A categorically believes Reduce, whereas 
B categorically believes ~ Reduce. Decision-makers are not permitted to believe both 
propositions by logic alone, but they are entitled to choosing a side, given Peter-
son’s endorsement of (PER). Whichever side is taken, though, leads to a neglect 
of evidence since one of the experts’ opinions that is supposed to be recognized is 
completely discounted. The (PER) constraint consequently results in understating 
the evidential support that exists for the proposition(s) decision-makers choose to 
disbelieve.
Fortunately for IP, it safeguards against both exaggerating and neglecting evi-
dence by stopping short of saying too much and saying too little. If precautionary-
based reasoning prohibits both overstating and understating the evidence, then the 
IP proposal should be preferred to Peterson’s qualitative account in representing the 
doxastic commitments of decision-makers under the EP.
4  Conclusion
I illustrated in this paper that the doxastic commitments of decision-makers under 
the EP can feasibly be interpreted probabilistically via the IP principle and that the 
representation is not subject to Peterson’s criticism against probabilistic rules. I also 
showed that the IP principle has further advantages, including avoiding an opposite 
concern that Peterson’s view is susceptible to, namely, understating the evidence.
While the proposed probabilistic account provides guidance on what to believe 
in the face of expert disagreement under precautionary-based considerations, I have 
not discussed in this paper how decision-makers should go about choosing among 
possible acts. Unfortunately, this issue is beyond the scope of the paper since the 
literature on decision-making with imprecise probabilities is vast and cannot be 
covered here. However, I will leave the reader with two suggestions that seemingly 
have a precautionary character. They are maxi-min (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989) and 
maximality (Walley, 1991).
The maxi-min rule requires decision-makers to maximize minimum expected 
value. The rationale behind the principle is that a decision-maker should err on the 
side of caution and select an option with the best worst-case outcome (see Wald, 
1945). The maximality rule permits a decision-maker to choose an act if and only if 
that act maximizes expected value for all probability functions in the decision-mak-
er’s set P. In relation to IP, an act is permissible if and only if all experts view that 
act as maximal. Thus, IP and maximality imply some kind of unanimity decision 
criterion—that is, the views on which act(s) is best are unanimous for all experts. 
The upshot of maximality in this context is that the decision criterion is robust, giv-
ing decision-makers some reassurance that a permitted act is maximal by the lights 
of all experts.
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Although both decision criteria appear to be precautionary in nature, neither is 
entirely uncontroversial. Again, it is beyond the scope of the paper to work out these 
details, but at least the two decision criteria offer some direction and furthermore 
illuminate the plausibility of IP since decision-makers are afforded more flexibility 
with respect to decision criteria when aiming to be precautious compared to a classi-
cal probabilistic representation and Peterson’s qualitative account.
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